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 Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch have summarized the disability 
rights critique of prenatal testing in two broad claims:1 “that prena-
tal genetic testing followed by selective abortion is morally problem-
atic, and that it is driven by misinformation.”2 These claims, though 
consonant with assertions of many pro-life groups, are intended to 
serve different ends. Parens and Asch explain that most authors as-
sociated with the disability rights critique are feminists who support 
a woman’s right to abortion.3 In contrast, pro-life adherents predicate 
differences between women and men on inexorable natural truths 
and define their position about abortion as an inevitable correlate of 
                                                                                                                    
 * Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of 
Law. 
 1. The term “critique” as used in this Article refers to the disability rights critique of 
prenatal testing, embryo selection and selective abortion. This Article discusses the work of 
Professor Adrienne Asch and others who have contributed to the development of the dis-
ability rights critique of prenatal genetic testing, embryo selection and selective abortion. 
The Article focuses on the work of Adrienne Asch because she participated in the Sympo-
sium from which this issue of the Law Review developed. See Adrienne Asch, Disability 
Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315 
(2003). Often, the Article speaks broadly about the work of the disability rights critique. 
Limitations of space preclude detailed discussion of differences among those associated 
with the work of the critique. Such differences do exist. 
 2. Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic 
Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 
3, 13 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000). Parens and Asch further describe the cri-
tique through three broad assertions: first, that discrimination is the central problem for 
disabled people and for their families; second, that those who abort a “desired child” be-
cause of a disability diagnosed through prenatal testing “suggest that they are unwilling to 
accept any significant departure from the parental dreams that a child’s characteristics 
might occasion”; and third, that selective abortion constitutes an “unfortunate, often misin-
formed decision that a disabled child will not fulfill what most people seek in child rear-
ing.” Id. at 12-13. 
 3. Id. at 12 (naming Adrienne Asch, Martha Saxton, Anne Finger, and Deborah Kap-
lan). 
344  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:343 
 
a world in which women and men enjoy different statuses and per-
form different roles.4 Yet, pro-life activists would seem further to 
echo adherents of the disability rights critique in categorizing abor-
tion of “‘damaged’ embryos” as the “most offensive” of all abortions.5 
Again, however, these concrete similarities are belied by each group’s 
encompassing goals. Adherents of the critique do not argue that se-
lective abortion is problematic because abortion is problematic. 
Moreover, the “misinformation” to which Parens and Asch refer does 
not refer expressly to the ontological status of the fetus.6 Rather, they 
refer to misinformation about “what life with disability is like for 
children with disabilities and their families.”7 To adherents of the 
critique, its basic propositions are not concerned centrally with abor-
tion. Rather these propositions concern attitudes toward disability 
and “toward children, parenthood, and ultimately ourselves.”8 
 The critique’s platform and analysis situate its adherents in the 
middle of a much wider discourse within American society about the 
scope and meaning of family. That discourse incorporates a series of 
related debates about reproduction (including abortion) and about 
the shifting contours of the relationship between parents and chil-
dren. 
 The work of those associated with the disability rights critique—
which seems often to belie social expectations about visions of family 
from the “left” and visions of family from the “right”—provides an 
unusual context within which to explore the dimensions of a broad 
                                                                                                                    
 4. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 201 (1984). 
Luker explains that “abortion has become a symbolic marker between those who wish to 
maintain this division of labor [based on gender] and those who wish to challenge it.” Id. 
This claim is representative, not comprehensive. It does not apply to all of those who op-
pose abortion. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, 
Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1074 (1989) (suggesting that we “give 
more credence both to arguments about how women’s well-being is affected by abortion leg-
islation and to arguments about how our valuation of life is affected by abortion policy” and 
attempting to “understand more fully the arguments of both the pro-choice and pro-life ad-
vocates”). 
 5. LUKER, supra note 4, at 207. Luker reports that for pro-life activists to defend 
“‘damaged’ embryos” is particularly praiseworthy because it is to defend “the weakest of 
the weak, and most pro-life people we interviewed were least prepared to compromise on 
this category of abortion.” Id. at 207-08. 
 6. Marsha Saxton speaks about a disability activist who identified fetuses as “our 
people.” Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A 
HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 374, 383 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998). Saxton 
comments: 
Are those in the disability rights movement who question or resist selective 
abortion trying to save the “endangered species” of disabled fetuses? When this 
metaphor first surfaced, I was shocked to think of disabled people as the target 
of intentional elimination, shocked to realize that I identified with the fetus as 
one of my “species” that I must try to protect. 
Id. 
 7. Parens & Asch, supra note 2, at 20. 
 8. Id. at 19. 
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ideology9 of personhood in terms of which Americans contemplate the 
shifting contours of family and of relationships between individuals 
and community more broadly. Those who have developed the critique 
oppose embryo selection and selective abortion while working to 
safeguard the right to abortion in general.10 They remain committed 
to autonomous individuality and choice, and they work to delineate 
the meaning of community. However, for those who favor a pro-
choice position, these propositions present hard questions. Moreover, 
as Adrienne Asch has suggested, the questions are not easily enter-
tained by law or the political process.11 
 This Article explores the ideological implications of sustaining a 
pro-choice position with regard to abortion generally alongside a po-
sition that frowns on abortion for the specific purpose of selecting 
against an embryo or fetus identified as carrying disabling traits. 
The exploration aims to contextualize each position within a broader 
social debate about the parameters of family life. It begins by pre-
suming that the specific debate about prenatal testing and abortion 
may prove valuable to a society increasingly anxious to re-construct 
the domestic arena and largely relegated to the institutions and lan-
guage of the law for advancing that agenda. 
 Part I of this Article considers the limitations of contemporary le-
gal and political processes in exploring the implications of prenatal 
genetic testing. Part II outlines the parameters of a debate related to 
the central concerns of the disability rights critique—a debate about 
family, generally, and about abortion, in particular—and considers 
the law’s role in that debate. Finally, Part III suggests that the fac-
tors that make it difficult to effect the agenda of the disability rights 
critique through legal channels are the same factors that establish 
the critique’s unusual significance for those concerned to understand 
the socio-cultural parameters of the debate about abortion and the 
                                                                                                                    
 9. The term “ideology” and the related term “ideological” are not used in this Article 
to refer to a system of political beliefs but rather to refer to the pervasive, often articulated, 
forms in terms of which people understand what it means to be a person. Janet L. Dolgin & 
JoAnn Magdoff, The Invisible Event, in SYMBOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY 351, 363 n.7 (Janet L. 
Dolgin et al. eds., 1977). This definition is similar to that of the French anthropologist 
Louis Dumont who wrote: 
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction of 
matter but one of point of view. We do not take as ideological what is left out 
when everything true, rational, or scientific has been preempted. We take eve-
rything that is socially thought, believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it 
is a living whole, the interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts 
would be blocked out by the a priori introduction of our current dichotomies. 
LOUIS DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX: THE GENESIS AND TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC 
IDEOLOGY 22 (1977). 
 10. Marsha Saxton suggests that “the reproductive rights movement emphasizes the 
right to have an abortion; the disability rights movement, the right not to have an abor-
tion.” Saxton, supra note 6, at 375. 
 11. See discussion infra Part I. 
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related, more widespread social debate about family. 
I.   BEYOND THE LAW: THE ABORTION DEBATE AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 
 Almost two decades ago Adrienne Asch wrote that the debate 
about abortion would be furthered were it more widely conducted 
outside the universe of “politics and the courts.”12 Asch is not a law-
yer or a law professor. It is thus unsurprising that her work, though 
read by lawyers and legal academics among others, is not for the 
most part aimed at transforming the law’s responses to abortion, 
prenatal embryo selection or other matters.13 Yet, her express prefer-
ence for considering abortion outside contexts defined by courts of 
law or by the political process14 is more than a simple statement of 
professional affiliation. 
 Asch’s preference was predicated on her sense that “rational dis-
cussion”15 about abortion and related matters is more likely to be fa-
cilitated in non-legal, non-political contexts. Law and politics, she 
implies, do not encourage people to listen carefully to the others’ po-
sitions and thus do not encourage people to re-consider, and perhaps 
amend, the nuances of their own positions. In contrast, judicial and 
political contexts stress practical results and foster a vision in which 
one either wins or one loses. Neither the courts nor the political proc-
ess have the luxury of facilitating the sort of intellectual debate 
which, effected in good faith, may carry its own rewards in facilitat-
ing clarification and enlightenment. 
 Even more, the law is not, at present, likely to provide a felicitous 
arena for effecting the central goals of the disability rights critique. 
In struggling to resolve disputes about abortion and about family re-
lationships more broadly, the law has relied on two competing as-
sumptions. The disability rights critique elides the first and rejects 
                                                                                                                    
 12. Adrienne Asch, Abortion in Context, WOMEN’S REV. BOOKS, Nov. 1985, at 12 
(reviewing ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES (Sidney Callahan & Daniel Callahan 
eds., 1984)).  
 13. Having said this, it must be noted that Asch has published in law reviews and has 
sometimes argued, much as any legal scholar might, for particular legal responses and 
against others. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Disability: 
Reflections on Social Justice and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 423 (2001) (argu-
ing for an interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994), that provides greater “equality, more inclusivity, and greater appreciation of 
the complexity of humanity in all its variability”). More specifically, Asch argues that more 
people should be allowed to file claims under the ADA even if their claims are later re-
jected by courts. Id. at 405. 
 14. In the American setting, as de Tocqueville realized over a century and a half ago, 
there often is only a thin space between political concerns and judicial responses. De Toc-
queville opined: “There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not 
sooner or later turn into a judicial one.” 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 248 (J.P. Mayer et al. eds., 1966) (1835). 
 15. Asch, supra note 12, at 13. 
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the second. First, and most widely, the law has presumed the 
autonomous individuality of family members, especially in contexts 
that do not implicate the scope of the parent-child relationship.16 In-
creasingly since the middle of the twentieth century, American law 
has safeguarded the right of adults within families to negotiate their 
own realities and effect their own choices. The disability rights cri-
tique aims to temper, though not to preclude, choice. Second, espe-
cially in the context of contentions about abortion, the law has modu-
lated its commitment to preserving the choices of autonomous indi-
viduals by limiting the right to abortion in light of the ontological 
status of the fetus. So, for instance, in Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services,17 the Supreme Court found that Missouri’s abortion 
law did not violate the right delineated in Roe18 in its express asser-
tion that “[t]he life of each human being begins at conception.”19 Ad-
herents of the disability rights critique generally reject contentions of 
this sort. 
 In general, those who have developed the disability rights critique 
are more concerned with the implications of prenatal genetic testing 
for the society as a whole than with individual decision-making. 
Adrienne Asch, for instance, does not oppose the right of a prospec-
tive parent to undergo prenatal testing and to abort a fetus.20 In fact, 
she would prefer that someone, convinced that he or she would be 
unable adequately to raise a disabled child, abort a disabled fetus 
than give birth to a child about whom the parent might remain am-
bivalent and whose needs the parent might not be able or ready to 
meet.21 Asch would thus favor responses that generally lie beyond the 
law’s capacity to design. 
 Asch’s preference—or more actually, perhaps, her plea—that the 
social debate about abortion (and, by implication, disability rights 
and prenatal testing) be entertained, at least some of the time, out-
side legal and political settings would seem to reflect other more sub-
tle concerns. These concerns are worth exploring. The exploration 
holds implications for the larger ideological context within which le-
gal and political responses to abortion and disability rights are being 
constructed and transformed. 
 In the two decades since Asch expressed a preference for discuss-
ing the implications of abortion outside legal and political contexts, 
                                                                                                                    
 16. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.  
 17. 492 U.S. 490, 504 n.4 (1988). 
 18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 19. Id. at 506. Justice Rehnquist explained that the statement, found in the state 
statute’s preamble, could be read merely to delineate a value judgement. Id. 
 20. Telephone interview with Adrienne Asch, Henry R. Luce Professor of Biology, Eth-
ics, and the Politics of Human Reproduction, Wellesley College (June 5, 2002). 
 21. Id. 
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the disability rights critique has focused its agenda and concerns 
around a series of issues involving reproduction and the avoidance of 
reproduction that American society has largely left to the law and 
the political process to frame and to resolve.22 In considering these is-
sues, the law has constructed a morality of choice that values 
autonomous individuality at the expense of community. Secondarily 
it has relied, in a few limited contexts, on a “traditional” morality 
that presumes communities defined through inequality and hierar-
chy (as in the relationship between parents and children). The law 
has not, however, produced a coherent morality of “modernity” that 
aims to safeguard community and autonomy. 
 Asch’s preference for furthering the debate about abortion outside 
legal and political contexts may encourage innovative responses, not 
constrained by familiar legal presumptions about personhood and 
community. The remainder of this Article examines responses—
many legal, some not—to abortion and disability rights in order bet-
ter to understand the ideological context within which law and soci-
ety respond to the related concerns in American society about fami-
lies, abortion and prenatal testing. 
II.   MATTERS OF MORALS / MATTERS OF LAW 
A.   The Ideological Context of Debate 
 Questions about abortion and prenatal testing are encompassed 
within a broader debate in contemporary American society about the 
scope and parameters of family (and of personhood and community). 
That debate has garnered widespread attention since the second half 
of the twentieth century. This Part of the Article delineates the con-
tours of that debate, suggests that the debate has largely been left to 
the law because of the erosion of alternative institutional arbiters, 
and briefly indicates the tenor of the law’s response. That response 
suggests the need,23 as Asch intuited more than twenty years ago, for 
alternative arenas encouraging discourse about families, disabilities, 
and personhood. 
                                                                                                                    
 22. There are, of course, other contexts within which discourse about society’s treat-
ment of disabled people is furthered. For the most part, the discourse has been channeled 
by appeal to the legal and political processes. Among the most important successes of that 
appeal to law and politics was the promulgation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
 23. Despite the apparent need for alternative institutional arbiters of moral ques-
tions, almost none are available in the contemporary American context outside small, gen-
erally marginal, and often isolated religious communities. 
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B.   The Ideological Context: The Debate About Family 
 The roots of the contemporary debates about abortion and family 
life lie in the history of the American family. The so-called “tradi-
tional” family appeared at the end of the eighteenth and start of the 
nineteenth centuries in response to the needs and pressures of the 
Industrial Revolution. This family replaced the larger24 colonial fam-
ily that functioned as an interconnected part of local communities.25 
 By the nineteenth century, American society envisioned the ideal 
family as contrasting in almost every regard with the marketplace.26 
In the marketplace, putatively equal autonomous individuals were 
expected, in theory though far less often in fact, to negotiate the 
terms of their own bargains. In contrast, the family was understood 
as a hierarchical whole, defined through love rather than through 
money.27 Moreover, within families roles depended on gender. The 
home was associated with women and children and the marketplace 
with men. Society envisioned the nineteenth century home as a ha-
ven from within which to escape the harsh tensions of the market-
place. At home, wives and mothers were expected to provide caring 
sanctuary to their working husbands and treasured children.28 Thus 
throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, 
the home was differentiated from the marketplace as an arena that 
valued status more than achievement, hierarchy more than equality, 
and the social whole more than individual autonomy. State law regu-
                                                                                                                    
 24. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 6 (1985) (attributing decline in family size after the colo-
nial period to shifts in fertility patterns). 
 25. As John Demos explained, colonial families were “continuous” with the larger so-
cial world both socially and economically. JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT AND PERSONAL: 
THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28 (1986). 
 26. See GROSSBERG, supra note 24, at 6-7 (attributing development of nineteenth-
century family to combination of laissez faire ideology of marketplace and egalitarian ide-
ology of the new Republic). 
 27. David Schneider, an anthropologist who studied the American family just before it 
began openly to shed traditional forms, posited the contrast between home and work to sit   
at the center of the ideology that defined traditional American families. DAVID M. 
SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 45-49 (1968). Schneider wrote: 
 The set of features which distinguishes home and work is one expression of 
the general paradigm for how kinship relations should be conducted and to 
what end. These features form a closely interconnected cluster. 
 The contrast between love and money in American culture summarizes this 
cluster of distinctive features.  
 . . . .  
 . . . [T]he opposition between money and love is not simply that money is ma-
terial and love is not. Money is material, but love is spiritual. The spiritual 
quality of love is closely linked with the fact that in love it is personal consid-
erations which are the crucial ones. 
Id. at 48-49. 
 28. DEMOS, supra note 25, at 31 (describing traditional family as refuge and loving 
“fortification”). 
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lated this “traditional” family through rules that contrasted with the 
rules that regulated life in the marketplace. 
 During this period, family life did change, but it was not for a cen-
tury and a half that the “traditional” family began visibly to collapse. 
Before the late twentieth century, the family underwent a compara-
tively subtle process of transition. That process, much as the more 
revolutionary process of change in family life that commenced in the 
second half of the twentieth century, was reflected in legal changes.29 
These legal changes suggested, at first tentatively, a new social 
readiness—not broadly acknowledged for another century and a 
half—to define family members in certain contexts for certain pur-
poses through Enlightenment values,30 especially equality and lib-
erty. 
 For over a century, however, society continued to portray the fam-
ily generally as a social unit that ideally reflected community rather 
than individuality and fixed roles rather than bargain and choice. 
Only in the second half of the twentieth century did society and the 
law openly acknowledge and reinforce a vision of family broadly 
predicated on Enlightenment values, including especially equality 
and liberty (framed as autonomy). Family members, especially 
adults, began increasingly to view themselves as autonomous indi-
viduals free to negotiate the terms of their familial relationships. 
 That shift is reflected in a wide set of demographic changes, in-
cluding increases in the incidence of divorce, nonmarital cohabita-
tion, and nonmarital parentage.31 These changes in turn are reflected 
in far-reaching legal changes including, for instance, the Supreme 
Court’s delineation of a constitutional right to privacy in familial set-
tings,32 the acceptance of prenuptial agreements33 and of cohabitation 
                                                                                                                    
 29. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 30. In both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, changes in family law reflected, 
far more than they effected, social changes. So, for instance, the promulgation of laws re-
ferred to generally as Married Women’s Property Acts, in the mid-nineteenth century freed 
married women from some part of the legal limitations regarding property ownership that 
marriage once brought to them. LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 13 
(2d ed. 2000). These statutes were generally uncontroversial when they were adapted by 
state legislatures. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN 
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 4, 6 (1991) (noting American families underwent 
“[d]ramatic social, demographic, and economic changes during the past 30 years”).  
 32. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-66 (1973) (defining limited constitutional 
right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972) (finding a state contra-
ception statute to be an unconstitutional interference with privacy rights of unmarried 
adults and expressly recognizing family members as autonomous individuals); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding a state contraception statute to be an un-
constitutional intrusion on the right to marital privacy).  
 33. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970) (finding that public pol-
icy supports enforcement of prenuptial agreements); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 
666 (Ga. 1982) (relying expressly on contract law to enforce a prenuptial agreement); Os-
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agreements,34 and the so-called “no fault” divorce revolution.35 After 
the 1960s, these changes occurred quickly and dramatically and re-
sulted in widespread legal debate in courts, in legislatures, and in 
law schools, about the meaning of family and the implications of fam-
ily life. 
C.   The Erosion of Institutional Arbiters36 
 In an earlier time, questions about the moral and practical scope 
of family life were considered by a wide variety of institutional arbi-
ters. But in the late twentieth century, those institutional settings 
collapsed or became far less central to or interested in defining the 
parameters of the domestic sphere. In part, this is a product of the 
same economic, political and social forces that re-defined the family. 
 Churches, schools, and voluntary communal groups were among 
the central institutions that traditionally directed discourse about 
the contours of family life in the United States. After World War II, 
each became significantly less important as an arbiter of moral mat-
ters within society generally. Churches, identified by de Tocqueville 
in the nineteenth century as central to the construction and signifi-
cance of American mores,37 began clearly to wither in significance in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Church attendance declined 
and even those who continued to attend churches became less com-
mitted to particular denominations and church communities.38 Simi-
larly, the influence of schools in delineating the proper scope of fam-
                                                                                                                    
borne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815 (Mass. 1981) (upholding the validity of a prenuptial 
contract).   
 34. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (1988); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 
1976) (enforcing non-meretricious contract between non-marital cohabitants); Morone v. 
Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (recognizing express contracts between 
nonmarital cohabitants). 
 35. In 1969 California became the first state to provide for no-fault divorce. See Act of 
Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312. Within a decade, almost every state provided 
for some form of divorce that did not depend on accusations of fault. See generally Doris 
Jonas Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the American Jurisdictions (as of June 1, 1974), 8 
FAM. L.Q. 401, 402-23 (1974) (listing grounds for divorce by state). 
 36. The parameters and significance of the erosion of institutional arbiters in the late 
twentieth century in the United States are discussed in more detail in Janet L. Dolgin, The 
Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 351-54 
(2002). 
 37. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: 
One cannot . . . say that in the United States religion influences the laws or po-
litical opinions in detail, but it does direct mores, and by regulating domestic life 
it helps to regulate the state. 
I do not doubt for an instant that the great severity of mores which one notices in 
the United States has its primary origin in beliefs.  
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 14, at 268. 
 38. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 73-74 (2000). 
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ily relationships declined dramatically after World War II.39 In fact, 
parents and the government have seemed similarly uninterested in 
schools generally, at least compared with other periods40 and other 
countries.41 Moreover, a large number of voluntary communal groups, 
regarded by de Tocqueville as essential to the preservation of the 
American moral order,42 have ceased to exist or continue to exist but 
without active members.43 These shifts have left Americans, faced 
with disputes about the parameters of family life, more inclined to 
turn to the law for resolutions. 
 Yet, as Asch intuited almost two decades ago, the law’s responses 
to disputes about family matters are often limited in form and scope. 
In particular, at least since the 1970s, the law, in responding to dis-
putes involving family and other communal relationships and identi-
ties, has generally been committed to autonomous individuality and 
to the protection and elaboration of individual rights.44 Thus the law 
has been increasingly ready to sacrifice the demands of community to 
those of individual autonomy. In the last several decades, the law’s 
commitment to individuality has inevitably shaped debate in the 
United States about a related set of matters, including, for instance, 
families, reproduction, the avoidance of reproduction, and privacy—
including reproductive privacy. 
 And so, in fact, despite Asch’s reasonable preference for furthering 
debate outside, as well presumably as inside, legal and political con-
texts, the tone and dimensions of debate in the United States about 
both abortion and family life have been largely forged in courts of law 
and in political responses to those courts’ presumptions and pro-
nouncements. The law has provided a fulcrum for vociferous, often 
antagonistic, debate about abortion. However, the shape of the public 
debate about abortion has been limited and its most important impli-
cations have largely been disguised as opposing groups have sought 
to gain the law’s assistance in effecting concrete agendas, often at the 
                                                                                                                    
 39. The role of schools in directing moral discourse generally has declined dramati-
cally since World War II.  Neil Postman has noted, for instance, that in the early decades 
of the Republic it was assumed that an educator’s job included teaching about the “Ameri-
can creed” and the values it was presumed to reflect. NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE 
OF CHILDHOOD 140, 150-52 (1982). 
 40. Robert Putnam notes a startling decline in the number of parents who have par-
ticipated in Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) after the 1950s. PUTNAM, supra note 38, 
at 55-57. He reports that about a quarter million families a year dropped out of PTAs for 
two and a half decades after 1960. Id. at 56. 
 41. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE 143 (1997) (noting that in the 
U.S., funding education is not a national priority as it is in many other countries). 
 42. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 14, at 485-88.  
 43. PUTNAM, supra note 38. 
 44. Many legal scholars have commented in recent decades on the focus that Ameri-
can law places on what Mary Ann Glendon refers to as “rights discourse” (or “rights talk”). 
MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 7 
(1991). 
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expense of furthering what Asch calls “rational discussion.”45 In this 
regard, the disability rights critique could provide a useful perspec-
tive on abortion and relationships within family settings generally. 
This is so, insofar as the critique combines a focus on communal re-
sponsibility with an interest in safeguarding individuals’ rights and 
therein reflects aspects of both pro-choice and pro-life positions in the 
abortion debate. 
D.   A Discourse About Abortion Alongside                                         
the “Debate About Abortion”46 
 In significant part, the struggle in the United States about abor-
tion has been played out through appeals to legal institutions, includ-
ing courts and legislatures. The history of that struggle suggests the 
limits of the law as a moral arbiter. This Part sketches the ideologi-
cal contours of the debate about abortion as one component of the 
wider debate about family. It further suggests that the law’s intense 
involvement in shaping abortion rights and other family relation-
ships, especially in the last half century, has shaped discourse in 
light of the law’s capacity to contemplate disputes and to preclude or 
resolve them. This Part is thus intended to serve as background to 
the next Part, which considers the place of the disability rights cri-
tique in broadening social discourse about abortion and about family 
relationships. 
 Since the middle of the twentieth century, American society and 
law, long committed to autonomous individuality in the marketplace, 
have become increasingly committed to valuing and safeguarding 
autonomous individuality in family settings.47 The law’s increasing 
readiness to resolve family disputes through principles of constitu-
tional law has reinforced this commitment.48 The Supreme Court 
rarely entertained family matters before the second half of the twen-
tieth century.49 Since that time, shifts in constitutional jurisprudence 
have facilitated family litigants’ invocation of Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process and equal protection rights.50 This jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                    
 45. Asch, supra note 12, at 13. 
 46. I am now working on an essay (Embryos as Symbols: A New Debate in an Old 
Guise) that focuses more extensively on the issues considered in this Part that cannot be 
addressed here in light of present space limitations. 
 47. See supra Part II.B (characterizing shifts in social and legal understanding of 
family life in last half of twentieth century). 
 48. See generally Dolgin, supra note 36 (describing frequency with which Americans 
turn to law, and especially to constitutional law, to resolve moral disputes). 
 49. The domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction precludes access to fed-
eral courts for family litigants without a federal cause of action. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 
504 U.S. 689, 698-99 (1992). 
 50. See EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 13 (1986) 
(noting significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to late twentieth 
century jurisprudence involving family matters). 
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presumes individual rights, and has consequently resulted in a set of 
constitutional protections for individuals within families. So, for the 
most part, at present, constitutional law protects the autonomous in-
dividual and a concomitant right to choice, of family members, and 
especially of adults within families.51 For the most part, constitu-
tional law has not provided for a comparably coherent response to de-
fining and protecting relationships that do not presume autonomous 
individuality. So, for instance, the Supreme Court has been far less 
successful at defining and safeguarding family relationships between 
parents and children52 than at safeguarding the autonomous indi-
viduality of adults within family settings.53 
 The limited right to abortion, defined in Roe,54 and re-assessed, 
but in some part preserved, in Casey,55 depends on a jurisprudence 
that presumes autonomous individuality. That jurisprudence is un-
problematic unless the status of the fetus is invoked and balanced 
against the “status” of the woman.56 The pregnant woman, defined in 
Roe as free to effect some, though not all, choices about abortion,57 
can be understood within the same ideological framework that 
encouraged the Court, eight years earlier in Eisenstadt v. Baird,58 to 
                                                                                                                    
 51. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court in Casey 
reaffirmed the basic right of a pregnant woman to abortion, noting expressly that the deci-
sion followed in significant part from the Court’s concern with protecting “individual lib-
erty” and its commitment to stare decisis. Id. at 857. The Court wrote: 
An entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in de-
fining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive deci-
sions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe’s 
central holding a doctrinal remnant; Roe portends no developments at odds with 
other precedent for the analysis of personal liberty.  
Id. at 860-61. 
 52. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (invalidating Washington State’s 
nonparental visitation statute as applied). 
 53. This jurisprudence reflects the absence of social consensus with regard to the 
meaning of childhood and the scope of the parent-child relationship. The confused state of 
the Court’s reasoning about children-in-families is illustrated by its 2000 decision in Trox-
el. Id. See also, Dolgin, supra note 36, at 369-92 (analyzing limitations of the Court’s deci-
sion in Troxel). 
 54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 55. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. In Casey, the Court re-structured Roe’s delineation of 
the moral implications of the biological dimensions of pregnancy. In particular, Casey 
abandoned the trimester framework erected in Roe. See id. at 872-73. That conclusion, 
clearly responsive to claims about the status of the fetus, facilitated the Court’s upholding 
of a set of state regulations that seem clearly to interfere with a woman’s right to abortion. 
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, at issue in Casey, required, among other 
things, that a woman seeking an abortion be given certain information before the abortion 
and wait at least twenty-four hours before having the procedure performed; required a mi-
nor seeking an abortion to get parental consent from at least one parent or go before a 
judge for permission, among other things; and required a married woman seeking an abor-
tion to notify her husband. Id. at 844. In Casey, the Court upheld the first two regulations 
and declared the third unconstitutional. Id. at 887-98. 
 56. See infra notes 62, 70 and accompanying text. 
 57. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
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couraged the Court, eight years earlier in Eisenstadt v. Baird,58 to 
view adults’ sexual relationships as subject to individual choice 
rather than to traditional, fixed understandings of sexuality, mar-
riage and reproduction.59 Thus, in some part, the Supreme Court’s 
responses to the debate about abortion parallel responses to the 
wider debate within American society about the right of family mem-
bers to construct the terms of their relationships. 
 There is, however, an alternative perspective within the debate 
about abortion that the Court and the legal system more broadly 
have been willing to entertain. This perspective brings a counter-
weight to the presumed importance of choice and individuality. While 
those favoring a right to abortion have consistently stressed the right 
to individuality and to equality of women within the domestic 
sphere,60 opponents of abortion, generally identified as adherents of 
tradition in family matters,61 have stressed the ontological status of 
the fetus as a moral being—a person, in effect. 
 Insofar as pro-life voices have framed the political struggle about 
abortion in terms of the ontological status of the fetus, they have cre-
ated a basis for decision-making, not predicated on the valuation of 
autonomous individuality. This framework, which has proved mod-
erately effective as a strategic matter, has also served to disguise, 
and thus to further, a more encompassing agenda. The larger agenda 
implicates not only the status of embryos and fetuses but the mean-
ing of personhood and the scope of family relationships. Thus, it im-
plicates the locus of power within familial, and other communal, set-
tings. 
 For abortion opponents, assertions about the fetus-as-child have 
provided the sort of strategic tool that has largely been lacking in 
other contexts involving legal responses to adults’ expanded choices, 
especially about reproductive matters, within family contexts. In the 
                                                                                                                    
 58. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (defining constitutional right of an individual, whether mar-
ried or not, to use contraception). 
 59. Clearly, traditional understandings of these matters are themselves subject to 
change. The essential difference between traditional understandings and modern under-
standings is not the presence or absence of change, but is located in a comparison between 
fixed statuses and attendant roles on the one hand and autonomous choice on the other. 
See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN 
AN UNEASY AGE 14-15 (1997) (contrasting traditional and modern ideologies of family). 
 60. David J. Langum, A Personal Voyage of Exploration through the Literature of 
Abortion History, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 693, 702-03 (2000) (generally opposing abortion 
on grounds that “abortion is the killing of a life form” but recognizing the presence of re-
sponsible argument among those favoring right to abortion). 
 61. See, e.g., LUKER, supra note 4, at 192-215 (comparing responses of activists on 
both sides of debate about abortion). Luker correlated value judgments among a group of 
women activists about the status of the fetus on the one hand and about the scope of family 
life on the other, and concluded that the abortion debate provides a forum for contemplat-
ing a wider set of issues, including the parameters and meaning of motherhood. Id. 
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struggle over abortion, the centrality of claims about the status of the 
fetus in arguments presented by abortion opponents has proved pow-
erful, though not determinative, in advancing a pro-life agenda.62 It 
has even resulted in those who support a right to abortion hesitating, 
at least in public contexts, to explore questions about the ontology of 
fetal development.63 The centrality of legal responses in the debate 
about abortion has compelled those involved on all sides to sacrifice 
expansive discourse in the hope of legal victory. In consequence, a 
wider and more far-reaching social debate within society about the 
implications of abortion has largely been foreclosed in public settings. 
 This suggests the potential importance of the disability rights cri-
tique to the wider debate about abortion and of Asch’s early intuition 
that questions about abortion might best be furthered outside legal 
and political settings. In short, the work of those within the disability 
rights movement,64 who favor protecting a woman’s right to abortion 
but who disfavor abortion for purposes of precluding the birth of a 
disabled child, challenges society to engage actively in a wider debate 
about abortion and the implications of abortion discourse for the 
meaning of personhood and the scope of family. 
III.   THE DISABILITY RIGHTS CRITIQUE, THE DEBATE ABOUT 
ABORTION, AND THE MEANING OF FAMILY 
 The disability rights critique belies expectations about differences 
in the ethos and world view of those who favor a legal right to abor-
tion and of those who oppose that right.65 Firmly committed to 
Enlightenment values and an ideology that prizes choice and 
                                                                                                                    
 62. After Roe, pro-life advocates worked, for instance, to amend the Constitution to 
provide that life begins “from the moment of conception.” KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & 
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 531 (14th ed. 2001) (considering changes in two 
decades after Roe). By the late 1980s many commentators presumed that the Court was 
ready to overrule Roe. Id. However, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), 
the Court upheld (while modifying the limits of) the basic right to abortion defined in Roe. 
After Roe, pro-life groups worked assiduously to focus the debate about abortion around a 
set of presumed biological truths. Ronald Dworkin, The Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 404 (1992) (noting claims about biological status of fetus). Abortion 
opponents portray fetuses as babies, stressing, for instance, that after conception an em-
bryo has a “biological blueprint for a new individual.” Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the 
Body, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 325-26 (1992) (quoting Ray Kerrison, Backdrop to Bush’s 
Court Selection: Pictures Show What Abortion is About, N.Y. POST, July 25, 1990, at 2). 
Proponents of the right to abortion deny that conception, or any other biological milestone 
during gestation, endows the fetus with moral standing. See, e.g., C.R. AUSTIN, HUMAN 
EMBRYOS: THE DEBATE ON ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 22-31 (1989) (showing difficulty of set-
tling on any moment in biological development as conclusive of the status of personhood). 
 63. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 6, at 390 (noting “taboo” placed on discussions of the 
fetus among feminists). 
 64. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch & Gail Geller, Feminism, Bioethics and Genetics, in 
FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 318 (Susan Wolf ed., 1996); Saxton, 
supra note 6, at 374. 
 65. LUKER, supra note 4, at 194-215. 
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autonomous individuality, those who have constructed the critique 
are concerned as well with elaborating an understanding of relation-
ships and community that may sometimes preclude or limit choice.66 
Thus the critique reflects modernity’s commitment to individuality 
and choice, but it modifies that commitment for the sake of safe-
guarding a community67 of disabled people. 
 The critique presumes autonomy but prizes community. It values 
choice but is cognizant of the risk of sacrificing communal responsi-
bility to individual preference. Many of those associated with the cri-
tique identify as feminists and/or leftists.68 Yet some of their central 
positions, especially if viewed outside the critique’s larger ideological 
frame, seem more consonant with a pro-life than a pro-choice plat-
form. The readiness of the critique’s adherents to cross starkly de-
fined lines of social and legal debate makes it difficult for them to de-
pend on extant legal responses in advancing the critique’s agenda. At 
the same time, however, the critique, precisely because it merges 
(and values) a number of arguments and assertions more generally 
viewed as ideological antagonists in the debates about abortion and 
family life, suggests a new framework within which to contemplate 
and analyze abortion, personhood and communal (including familial) 
relationships. 
A.   The Disability Rights Critique and the Law 
 In significant part, the critique’s agenda is not represented in the 
language of the law or directed at law-makers.69 American law, re-
flecting disharmony about abortion within society, has variously pro-
vided for those anxious to safeguard a right to abortion and for those 
who oppose abortion. Sometimes courts have institutionalized as-
pects of each position.70 But the law has generally done that without 
mediating the ideological concerns of those who value autonomous 
                                                                                                                    
 66. Parens & Asch, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
 67. See infra notes 80, 81 and accompanying text (for consideration of that commu-
nity’s construction). 
 68. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch & Michelle Fine, Shared Dreams: A Left Perspective on 
Disability Rights and Reproductive Rights, in WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES 297 (Michelle 
Fine & Adrienne Asch eds., 1988); Parens & Asch, supra note 2, at 12. 
 69. Many of the law’s limitations in facilitating social debate about abortion (which 
Asch recognized almost twenty years ago) apply as well to debate about prenatal testing, 
embryo selection, and selective abortion. See Asch, supra note 12. 
 70. So, for instance, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to abortion delineated in Roe. 505 U.S. 833, 846-
53 (1992). The Court’s plurality announced, however, that  
a woman’s liberty is not so unlimited . . . that from the outset the State cannot 
show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal devel-
opment the State’s interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of the 
woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.  
Id. at 869. 
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choice and of those who value limitations on choice. The law’s re-
sponses to abortion have not stilled controversy. Instead, they have 
hardened lines of debate and have sharpened a sense that disagree-
ments about abortion constitute a battleground on which the voices 
of modernity oppose those of tradition. 
 In this context, appeals to the law by those concerned with regu-
lating abortion almost always rely either on the language of choice 
and individual autonomy or on language committed to the person-
hood of the fetus. Thus, often, pro-choice and pro-life adherents 
speak past each other. Partly for strategic reasons, those appealing 
to the law to provide for or to prohibit abortion have generally not 
forged alternative, more nuanced approaches. The law’s responses, in 
turn, have encouraged ever sharpened dispute and have strength-
ened perceptions of the debate about abortion—and about the larger 
set of family issues that the debate about abortion symbolizes—as 
essentially impervious to mediation. 
 The work of the critique’s advocates offers an alternative frame 
for discourse. The critique has situated itself adjacent to, rather than 
inside, the law’s debate about abortion—in part because the law’s re-
sponses to abortion provide no place for the critique’s vision. The law 
has furthered the ends of those committed to pro-choice positions by 
constitutionalizing a right to choice in reproductive matters. The cri-
tique’s willingness to limit choices about abortion precludes comfort-
able alliance with some pro-choice rhetoric and with the legal frame-
work reflecting that rhetoric. On the other hand, the law has fur-
thered the ends of those committed to pro-life positions by focusing 
on the ontological status of the fetus. The willingness of the critique’s 
adherents to provide generally for abortion precludes alliance with 
most pro-life programs and with the legal framework that supports 
those programs. 
 In fact, those associated with the disability rights critique do not 
generally aim to curtail women’s legal choices about abortion. 
Rather, they aim to reshape the ground on which those choices are 
entertained by individuals and by society. They urge, for instance, 
that physicians, other health care workers, and genetic counselors 
advising women and couples about the implications of prenatal test-
ing be encouraged to think about prenatal testing and selective abor-
tion more expansively than is generally the case.71 The hope is that, 
as a result, such counselors will more often refrain from presuming, 
                                                                                                                    
 71. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 6, at 381-90 (reframing implications of prenatal 
screening and selective abortion).   
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and thus unthinkingly communicating, the belief that any fetus iden-
tified as disabled should be aborted.72 
 The work of the disability rights critique suggests that opposing 
positions in the debate about abortion (and family matters more 
widely) may be more open to mediation than is generally presumed. 
In working to construct a program that values the notion of auton-
omy, generally prized by those identified as pro-choice, and that val-
ues limitations on choice, generally prized by those identified as pro-
life, the critique offers new options for discourse, and ultimately for 
shared understanding. Moreover, the critique promises to enrich de-
bate by suggesting the ideological commonality of the debate’s an-
tagonists. At base, neither set of voices in the debate about abortion 
rejects the significance of choice and neither rejects the significance 
of community. Both interests are foundational to virtually all con-
temporary discourse about abortion and about the parameters of the 
domestic arena. Indeed, taken together, the pro-choice and pro-life 
positions in the debate about abortion reflect the parameters of the 
ideological framework within which Americans broadly understand 
personhood. 
B.   The Disability Rights Critique and American Ideology 
 In short, the critique’s central propositions73 as well as its broader 
agenda suggest that pro-choice and pro-life positions can be envi-
sioned as ideological points within a broader debate rather than as 
absolute, unbridgeable ideological opposites. In aiming to protect in-
dividual autonomy while focusing on the construction of community, 
the critique suggests areas of compatibility and shared concern.74 
These include concern for safeguarding choice, a concern often elided 
by pro-life adherents, self-consciously aligned with tradition; and 
concern for responsible community that sometimes trumps choice 
and individuality, a concern often elided by pro-choice adherents, 
self-consciously aligned with modernity and firmly committed to 
autonomous choice. 
 Adrienne Asch and Michelle Fine have summarized the broad 
goals of the disability rights movement to include “a commitment to 
                                                                                                                    
 72. See Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed My Mind About Prenatal Diagnosis, 
in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 234 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 
2000) (noting messages communicated in settings involving prenatal testing and subse-
quent abortion); Asch & Fine, supra note 68, at 297. Asch and Fine assert that “[g]enetic 
counselors, physicians, and all others involved with assisting women during amniocentesis 
should gain and provide far more and very different information about life with disabilities 
than is customarily available.” Id. at 302. 
 73. Parens & Asch, supra note 2, at 12-13 (summarizing three central propositions of 
disability rights critique of prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion). 
 74. See, e.g., Asch & Fine, supra note 68, at 304. 
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self-determination and a shared sense of community, recognizing 
that the one is meaningless without a sense of the other.”75 More spe-
cifically, in valuing a woman’s right to abortion, the critique pre-
sumes the importance of choice in the initial decision to have or to 
preclude having children. In disfavoring the abortion of a particular 
(disabled) child, the critique values restrictions on choice with regard 
to the constitution of one’s children.76 
 In this regard, the critique’s encompassing agenda commits its 
adherents communal solidarity even if that necessitates limitations 
on choice. Those within the disability rights movement have implic-
itly embarked on an ideological journey committed to shaping and 
securing a construct of community. Others’ models of community 
provide tentative guideposts. Some adherents of the critique have in-
voked models of community identified through reference to race77 or 
gender.78 Others have sketched models of community through refer-
ence to the “social experience” of disability.79 None of the proposed 
frameworks adequately defines the disability community but each 
indicates the significance of the project.80 
                                                                                                                    
 75. Id. For Asch and Fine, effecting this goal would serve as well to constitute a “just 
and inclusive society.” Id. 
 76. This pattern, providing for toleration of diverse choices in the creation of family 
relationships but less room for choice in the constitution of family relationships, is reflected 
in the decisions of a few judges who have struggled to preserve the notion that adults 
within families should be free to negotiate the terms of their own relationships, but that 
choice should be limited with regard to children and the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., 
Janet L. Dolgin, A Rendezvous in the Marketplace? Transformations in Family Law in the 
United States, in REGULATING MORALITY: A COMPARISON OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN 
MASTERING THE MORES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES 193, 204 (Hans 
Krabbendam & Hans-Martien ten Napel eds., 2000). 
 77. Carol J. Gill, The Social Experience of Disability, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY 
STUDIES 365, 365 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001) (noting the experience of disability 
“may seem at first no different from the social stereotyping of other marginalized groups”). 
 78. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 6, at 374; Joanna K. Weinberg, Autonomy as a Differ-
ent Voice: Women, Disabilities, and Decisions, in WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 68, 
at 269, 269-71 (noting “similar patterns” in histories of women’s movement and disability 
rights movement). 
 79. ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE BODY SILENT 135 (1990) (identifying the social experi-
ence of disability with social exclusion from ordinary, everyday life). 
 80. During the second half of the twentieth century, many groups, anxious to redress 
social wrongs directed at their members, modeled their strategies on those developed in 
the context of the civil rights movement. This has proved problematic to African-Americans 
as well as to these groups. None share the particular history and experiences of African-
Americans. Moreover, the conflation of the history and experience of non-Black minority 
groups with the history and experience of African-Americans has served to mask the cen-
trality of racism in much of American history. 
 A framework modeled to reflect the social experience of disability is also of limited value 
in constructing the sort of community to which the critique’s adherents aspire. Among 
other things, as sketched by Carol Gill, this experience includes at its center a “persistent 
and disquieting sense of mistaken identity.” Gill, supra note 77, at 353. Committing the 
disability rights movement, writ large, to this identity may provide a basis for shared iden-
tity among some people with disabilities but is likely to limit, rather than to expand, the 
possibility of establishing communal relationships between disabled and non-disabled peo-
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 Asch suggests a different model for community in asserting that a 
society anxious to avoid the births of children with disabilities is a 
society unprepared to provide for the needs of existing people with 
disabilities.81 Her apperception suggests the need to define and 
strengthen communities that include disabled people along with peo-
ple not so identified. This community, envisioned with reference to 
its most felicitous potential, would reach beyond the social experience 
of disability and past various histories of social discrimination to 
convince “outsiders” that they are also “insiders” (and “insiders” that 
they may become, and can certainly profit from identifying with, 
“outsiders”). The disability rights movement may be especially well 
situated to construct a community able to temper autonomy with re-
spect for responsible personhood. That is so, insofar as no one is im-
mune from disability and no parent or potential parent is guaranteed 
to bear or to raise children free from disabilities and illness. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 In the American setting, the illusion of unending choice has be-
come increasingly compelling since the early years of the Industrial 
Revolution, first in the marketplace, and, a century and a half later, 
in the home. The discourse engendered by the disability rights cri-
tique may fail to persuade significant numbers of prospective par-
ents, especially those favoring a right to abortion, to forego selective 
abortion and embryo selection. Yet, the discourse stimulated by the 
disability rights critique may prove valuable in providing a new lens 
through which to consider the ideological constructs that shape un-
derstandings of personhood and of relationships between people 
within American society. And so, even if the work of the critique does 
not widely alter responses of society or the law to genetic testing, se-
lective abortion, and pre-implantation embryo selection, discourse 
engendered by the critique may encourage prospective parents to 
understand that the choice to undergo prenatal genetic testing and 
the choices that follow such testing are morally complicated. These 
are choices that implicate the scope and meaning of the parent-child 
relationship, as well as understandings of the “Other” (and thus in-
evitably of the Self) within society. 
 
                                                                                                                    
ple. For the disability rights movement, that is essential. And for the rest of society, it 
promises a model for “modern” communities that could prove extremely valuable. 
 81. Telephone conversation with Adrienne Asch, Henry R. Luce Professor of Biology, 
Ethics, and the Politics of Reproduction, Wellesley College (June 12, 2002). See also supra 
note 72. 
